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Voluntary Integration: Asking the Right
Questions
JAMES E. RYAN*
A little more than fifty years ago, the central legal question regarding
school desegregation was whether some schools would be required to
integrate. Today, remarkably, the central legal question is whether schools
are permitted to integrate voluntarily. Lower courts and commentators have
disagreed over the question of whether the Constitution permits public
elementary and secondary schools to take race into account when assigning
students. This Article explores the doctrinal issues raised by voluntary
integration plans and explains why such plans further a compelling interest
and can be sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny.
Court-ordered integration of public schools is fading from view and
school integration is not happening organically. Levels of segregation by race
and income are remarkably high, and they are rising rather than falling.! As
busing plans give way to neighborhood school assignments, public schools
are becoming as segregated as the neighborhoods in which they are located.
Until residential integration increases dramatically, most public schools will
remain racially isolated unless school boards adopt conscious measures to
achieve integration. It is that simple.
Some districts have already adopted integration plans, and these
programs are typically voluntary in two ways. First, they are not court-
ordered but generated by local legislative action. Second, they involve some
degree of school choice. Students may choose among schools, both regular
and specialized, but their choices are shaped by the goal of achieving greater
racial integration in some or all schools within the district or metropolitan
region.2 Some districts, for example, allow students to transfer from their
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neighborhood school to another if the transfer will enhance integration.3
Other districts take race into account when admitting students to magnet or
other specialized schools.4 Still others offer students numerous choices
among regular and specialized schools, and they consider race at the margins
in order to achieve some degree of racial balance among the schools. 5
In many instances, neighborhood schools remain the default option,
meaning that students have a right to attend their neighborhood school. Race
is taken into account only when students seek to attend a school outside of
their neighborhood or a specialized school not linked to a particular
residential area. These plans are thus relatively mild by comparison to the
"forced busing" ordered by courts in desegregation cases. Nonetheless, these
and other types of plans remain controversial.
Part of the controversy, not surprisingly, is political. Race and public
schools remain an explosive mixture, and some see desegregation as a failed
experiment that need not be repeated. I disagree with the latter perspective
and have written elsewhere about the benefits of racial and socioeconomic
integration.6 In my view, these benefits can be substantial, at least when
attention is paid to the conditions under which integration occurs, and they
can easily exceed the costs associated with voluntary integration plans. To
address the question around which this symposium was organized, for
example, Justice O'Connor's hope that affirmative action in admissions to
colleges and universities will no longer be needed in a generation may be
3 See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 7-9 (lst Cir. 2005)
[hereinafter Comfort Il] (describing voluntary integration plan adopted by Lynn,
Massachusetts). Comfort 11 is the en banc opinion of the First Circuit, which reversed the
earlier decision by a First Circuit panel. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 21791, at *1 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Comfort 1]. See also
Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 741-42 (2d Cir. 2000)
(describing voluntary integration plan in Rochester, New York metropolitan area).
4 See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 125-26 (4th
Cir. 1999) (describing admissions process for magnet schools in Montgomery County,
Maryland); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701-03 (4th Cir. 1999)
(describing admissions process for "alternative" schools in Arlington County, Virginia);
Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 793-94 (1st Cir. 1998) (describing admissions
process to the Boston Latin School, a public "examination" school).
5 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949,
954-56 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Parents Involved 1] (describing "open choice" plan
for Seattle high schools), rev'd Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) [hereinafter Parents Involved I1]; McFarland v.
Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 841-48 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (describing
student assignment plan in Jefferson County, Kentucky), affd McFarland v. Jefferson
County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
6 James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 296-307 (1999).
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overly optimistic under the best of circumstances.7 But it seems farfetched to
suppose that racial preferences in admissions will be rendered obsolete while
public schools remain racially and socioeconomically segregated, given the
wide gaps in performance between predominantly minority, urban, high-
poverty schools and their predominantly white, suburban, middle-class
counterparts.8
Rather than rehash the benefits of integrated schools, however, I would
like to focus instead on another source of controversy surrounding voluntary
integration plans, and this has to do with their constitutionality. To readers
who are familiar with the long and sometimes violent struggle to integrate
schools, but less familiar with the Court's affirmative action decisions, it
might seem odd that there is any real doubt that school districts can take
affirmative steps to integrate schools. Did we not just spend fifty years trying
to force recalcitrant districts to do precisely this? Did not the Court once
think it obvious that school officials could choose to integrate schools if they
so desired?9 Have we reached a point of "terminal silliness" in constitutional
law where school districts are prohibited from doing what federal courts were
ordering them to do just a few years ago?1°
Despite a reader's understandable surprise, there is actually a live
question about whether and when public schools may take race into account
in assigning students.1 The central issue concerns the relevance and
applicability of the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions in Grutter
and Gratz, which involved higher education, to the context of voluntary K-12
7 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today.").
8 See Ryan, supra note 6, at 274 (describing performance gap).
9 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
The Court observed that school authorities have
broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well
conclude... that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each
school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the
proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within
the broad discretionary powers of school authorities ....
Id. (emphasis added).
10 The phrase is borrowed from Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 639 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
analysis brought the Court's equal protection jurisprudence to the point of "terminal
silliness"). The court in McFarland made a similar point, observing that "[i]t would seem
rather odd that the concepts of equal protection, local control and limited deference are
now only one-way streets to a particular educational policy, virtually prohibiting the
voluntary continuation of policies once required by law." McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at
851.
11 See Holmes, supra note 2, at 575-85 (reviewing cases).
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integration plans. Before Grutter and Gratz, a number of decisions struck
down voluntary integration plans on the ground that they were not
sufficiently narrowly tailored.1 2 There have been three decisions by courts of
appeals since Grutter and Gratz, and all three courts have upheld the plans at
issue. 13 Despite the uniformity of results, these cases have provoked a great
deal of disagreement among appellate judges. Two of the three decisions
were decided by en banc courts which, by split votes, reversed contrary panel
decisions.1 4 Commentators are as divided as these courts over the
constitutionality of voluntary integration in light of Grutter and Gratz.1 5 And,
most importantly, the Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue. Thus, while
the early trend in post-Grutter cases is favorable toward voluntary integration
plans, the law is not yet settled.
The disagreement evident in the courts of appeals' decisions and the
commentary is somewhat understandable. Neither Grutter nor Gratz provides
any guideline to their application outside the setting of undergraduate or law
school admissions, and K-12 education is both similar to and different from
post-secondary education. At the same time, however, I believe that the
issues are less complicated than the split decisions and the divided
commentary suggest, and that common sense and an appreciation of history
point the way toward resolution. This Article explains why.
I. ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
A. The Wrong Question
Alexander Bickel smartly advised that "no answer is what the wrong
question begets. ' 6 Heeding this advice, the first question is one to put aside.
There should be little doubt that some voluntary integration plans are
12 See cases cited supra note 4.
13 Parents Involved I, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005); McFarland v. Jefferson
County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005); Comfort II, 418 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 2005).
14 Parents Involved II, 426 F.3d at 1162 (decided 7-4); Comfort II, 418 F.3d at 1
(decided 3-2).
15 Compare, e.g., Holmes, supra note 2, at 586-600 (arguing that voluntary
integration plans should be upheld as constitutional), with Wendy Parker, The Legal Cost
of the "Split Double Header"of Gratz and Grutter, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 602-
03 (Fall 2003) (suggesting that voluntary integration plans that do not rely on
individualized, merit-based decisions regarding assignments are constitutionally
vulnerable).
1 6 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITcs 103 (1962).
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constitutional. 17 It is implausible to imagine that the Supreme Court would
allow colleges and graduate schools to use race in selecting students but
would bar school boards from using race to integrate public schools.
However enmeshed in the tangles of doctrine the Supreme Court might find
itself in some cases, surely it will avoid any doctrinal trap that would allow
law schools but not public schools to integrate.
This situation calls to mind Bolling v. Sharpe,18 the companion case to
Brown v. Board of Education,19 which involved segregation in the D.C.
schools. As the Court itself acknowledged-or confessed, really, as a means
of justifying a less than persuasive doctrinal analysis-it simply could not
condone segregation in the nation's capital after striking it down in the
states.20 The same is true here: it is unthinkable that the Court would allow
affirmative action in admissions but would completely bar public schools
from taking steps to integrate. To the extent that constitutional law consists
of predicting what the Court will do, which seems apt as a description if not
as a normative proposition, let me express with utmost confidence that it
must be constitutional for school boards, under some circumstances, to use
race to integrate.2'
Which points to the real question: under what circumstances can school
boards use race for the purpose of voluntarily integrating schools?
Answering this question requires covering some familiar terrain.
B. Grutter and Gratz
The Court has made clear that (almost) any use of race by any
government official, whether for supposedly benign or obviously nefarious
purposes, triggers strict scrutiny. Indeed, just this past term, in a case
involving the segregation of prisoners, the Court again emphasized that strict
scrutiny remains the appropriate standard, regardless of the institutional
17 By "constitutional," I simply mean a prediction of what the Supreme Court will
likely decide, based on precedent. This assumes, as I believe safe in this context, that the
Court will rely primarily if not exclusively on precedent, rather than the original meaning
of the text, structure, or other sources. I take no position here, of course, on the general
issue of the proper methodology for deciding constitutional cases.
18 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
19 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500 ("In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits
the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.")
(emphasis added).
21 Cf Parents Involved 11, 426 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that "it
would be a perverse reading of the Equal Protection Clause that would allow"
universities to consider race when assembling their student bodies but not allow public
schools to consider race in an effort to integrate their student bodies).
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setting in which race is employed.22 There are some slight exceptions, most
notably regarding legislative redistricting, where strict scrutiny is not
triggered unless race is the predominant factor in drawing boundary lines.23
Nonetheless, it seems safe to start with the presumption that voluntary
integration plans will be subject to strict scrutiny.
In order to survive strict scrutiny, voluntary integration plans must
advance a compelling interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. This is where Grutter and Gratz come into play. In Grutter, the
Court reaffirmed Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and confirmed that
diversity in higher education is indeed a compelling interest.25 The Court also
set out a list of criteria by which to judge whether the use of race to achieve
the goal of diversity is narrowly tailored. In the admissions context, those
criteria require that (1) no quotas are used; (2) applicants are afforded
individualized and holistic consideration; (3) the plan does not unduly harm
members of any racial group; (4) the plan is adopted only after serious, good-
faith consideration has been given to race-neutral alternatives; and (5) the
plan is temporary.26
The different outcomes in Grutter, which upheld the admissions policy
of the University of Michigan Law School, and Gratz, which struck down the
University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy, turned on the
narrow tailoring criteria. The law school policy satisfied them,2 7 while the
undergraduate policy fell short, primarily because the Court concluded that
the policy failed to consider each applicant as an individual and instead used
race in an automatic and mechanical way.28
So how do Grutter and Gratz bear on the question of when voluntary
integration plans are constitutional? Some judges29 and commentators 30
22 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005) (rejecting argument that lower
standard should apply in prison setting and confirming that the Court applies "strict
scrutiny to all racial classifications to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool") (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
23 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (explaining that strict
scrutiny is triggered only when race is the "predominant" motivating factor in
redistricting).
24 But see Parents Involved 11, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (arguing
for "realistic rational basis review" because voluntary integration plans are different from
invidious discrimination, segregation and affirmative action).
25 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-33 (2003).
26 Id. at 333-44.
27 Id.
28 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-76 (2003).
29 See, e.g., Parents Involved II, 426 F.3d at 1209-20 (Bea, J., dissenting, joined by
Judges Kleinfeld, Tallmen, and Callahan); Parents Involved 1, 377 F.3d 949, 968-69 (9th
Cir. 2004).
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would adopt the analysis from Grutter and Gratz jot for jot, assuming that
what is good for graduate schools is good for elementary schools. This view
assumes that public schools are advancing the same interest as universities,
namely diversity writ large, and that they must be subject to the same narrow
tailoring criteria. As explained below, however, it seems a mistake to assume
that Grutter and Gratz resolve all of the questions presented by voluntary
integration plans.
C. Law School Is Not Grade School
The equation of higher education and K-12 education is overly facile and
misses the point of strict scrutiny, especially the narrow tailoring inquiry.
Colleges and graduate schools on the one hand, and public schools on the
other, are not attempting to achieve exactly the same goals when using race
in selecting students, and the correct application of strict scrutiny requires
careful attention to these differences. Similarly, using the same narrow
tailoring inquiry in both contexts ignores the fundamental differences
between these contexts and risks turning strict scrutiny into a sort of shell
game-where the use of race is condoned in principle but prohibited in
practice.
1. Compelling Interests
Colleges and graduate schools use race in admissions in an effort to
achieve a student body that is diverse along a number of dimensions,
including race, geography, experience, and talent. The benefits of this kind of
broad diversity are many, as the Court recognized. 31 They include the
promotion of cross-racial understanding and the amelioration of racial
stereotypes. Broad diversity also promotes a more "robust exchange of ideas"
and leads to more enriched, enlightening, and livelier classroom
discussions.32 In this sense, achieving diversity along racial, geographic, or
30 E.g., Parker, supra note 15, at 602-03 (arguing that "[e]ven if diversity is deemed
a compelling governmental interest in primary and secondary schools, choice-based
programs will have greater difficulty falling within the example of [Grutter] because of
the absence of merit based admissions"); David Levine, Public School Assignment
Methods After Grutter and Gratz: The View from San Francisco, Part I, 30 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 511, 518 (2003) ("[S]chool officials... will have little trouble articulating a
compelling governmental interest after Grutter," but "this does not necessarily mean that
they will be able to act upon that desire. If the officials seek to use race as an express
means of selecting and assigning students, after Gratz, they will have significant
difficulty meeting the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny analysis.").
31 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-33.
32 Id. at 329.
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experiential lines is a way to ensure viewpoint diversity.33 In addition, a
diverse student body helps prepare students for a diverse workplace and an
increasingly global marketplace.34 Finally, colleges and professional schools,
law schools in particular, train future leaders, and "[i]n order to cultivate a set
of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the
path to leadership is visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of
every race and ethnicity.,
35
Public schools use race in student assignments for a somewhat different
set of goals, which revolve around the benefits of racially integrated schools.
These benefits overlap with some of the benefits derived from a diverse
college or graduate student body. For example, racially integrated schools,
like diverse college campuses, promote cross-racial understanding, help
break down stereotypes, and prepare students for a diverse workplace.36 But
other goals and benefits diverge. Racially integrated schools, for example,
can promote academic achievement among minority students, typically
because racial integration and socioeconomic integration go hand in hand.37
Racially integrated schools can also help create a system of roughly
comparable schools, rather than a system of black and mostly poor schools
on the one hand and white and mostly middle-class schools on the other.
Schools that adopt racial integration plans, moreover, are not typically
seeking to enhance viewpoint diversity in classroom discussions, especially
at the primary school level, nor are they seeking to ensure that the "path to
leadership" remains visibly open to all.38
It is important, therefore, that the compelling interest question be posed
with some precision. The question is not, as some judges and commentators
have assumed, whether public schools, like universities, have a compelling
interest in achieving a broadly diverse student body. The precise question is
whether they have a compelling interest in creating or maintaining a racially
integrated student body.39 Grutter and Gratz provide only a partial answer,
insofar as the Court accepted as "substantial" the benefits of promoting
33 See Comfort I, 418 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) ('The admissions plan at issue in
Grutter strove for diversity along many axes, including race, in an effort to create a
student body with diverse viewpoints, thereby enriching classroom discussion and
academic experiences.").
34 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31.
35 Id. at 332.
36 See Ryan, supra note 6, at 303, 306-07.
37 See, e.g., McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852-55
(W.D. Ky. 2004) (discussing Jefferson County School Board's defense of its voluntary
integration plan).
38 See Comfort II, 418 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2005)
39 See Parents Involved II, 426 F.3d 1162, 1173-79 (5th Cir. 2005); Comfort II, 418
F.3d at 15.
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cross-racial understanding and breaking down racial stereotypes. But to the
extent that Grutter and Gratz also rely on viewpoint diversity, or on making
sure that the "path to leadership" is visibly open to all, those decisions do not
answer the precise question raised by voluntary integration plans at the
public school level.
This is not to suggest that the decisions in Grutter and Gratz make this a
hard question. Concluding that a diverse student body at colleges and
graduate schools furthers compelling interests does not mean, by negative
implication, that racially integrated schools are not important. Instead, it
simply means that courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, will have to
focus on the specific benefits of public school integration and not just parrot
the findings and conclusions from Grutter and Gratz. As discussed below,
those benefits are substantial, and there seems to be little reason to doubt that
the Court would find them compelling.
2. Narrow Tailoring
Framing the compelling interest question correctly is crucial because it
informs the narrow tailoring inquiry. n° If courts assume that public schools
are trying to achieve the same ends as colleges and universities, they are
going to be inclined to require them to follow the same means. Indeed, some
judges have already made this mistake and have asked, for example, why
voluntary integration plans focus solely on race and not on other student
characteristics that might enhance the overall diversity of the student body.
41
This question would make sense if public schools were trying to replicate the
broad diversity on college campuses, but that is not the point of most
voluntary integration plans.
As the Court made clear in Grutter, the narrow tailoring inquiry must
itself be tailored to the asserted compelling interest and the specific context
in which race is used.42 Consider, for example, the differences between
university admissions and the public school context. The admissions process
for selective colleges and graduate schools is competitive, merit-based, and
in some respects a zero-sum game. A student denied admission to the
University of Michigan Law School is not automatically sent to another
school, much less to a school of comparable quality. In the public school
context, by contrast, all students are guaranteed placement in a school, and
the schools themselves (at least those within the same district) are typically
comparable. The process of assigning students, moreover, is not competitive
40 See Parents Involved II, 426 F.3d at 1173.
41 Id. at 1210 (Bea, J., dissenting); Parents Involved 1, 377 F.3d 949, 970-72 (9th
Cir. 2004).
42 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333-34 (2003).
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and merit-based, outside of a few selective magnet or "examination" schools
at the secondary level. Indeed, although often lumped together, voluntary
integration plans at the public school level are not affirmative action plans.
The narrow tailoring inquiry ought to take these differences into account.
The initial narrow tailoring question, then, is not whether voluntary
integration plans satisfy the five criteria from Grutter and Gratz, but rather
what narrow tailoring criteria are appropriate in this context.a3 Although the
Court acknowledged the importance of context in Grutter, it did not indicate
how that inquiry should change when the context changes, nor did it give
much clue as to the proper inquiry in the public school context. Nonetheless,
one can begin to outline an appropriate inquiry by referring to the primary
purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement, which is to ensure that plans are
no broader than necessary to achieve their stated goals.
To recap, the constitutionality of voluntary integration plans has not been
resolved by Grutter and Gratz. Those decisions, mostly by virtue of the
results, make it safe to assume that voluntary integration plans are
constitutional under some conditions. But they do not specify what those
conditions might be. To identify them, one must first determine the actual
goals of voluntary integration plans. Assuming those goals are sufficiently
compelling, one must then formulate the appropriate restrictions on the use
of race to achieve them.
II. SOME ANSWERS
A. The Compelling Interests Advanced By Racially Integrated Schools
Whether racially integrated schools advance a compelling state interest
ought to be considered an easy question to answer, especially if one consults
both political and legal history. Presumably, the historical struggle to
integrate schools, carried out by parents, schoolchildren, federal courts, and
the federal executive, was not done for sport. To be sure, efforts to integrate
were remedial and triggered by a finding of purposeful segregation; the Court
never recognized a free-standing right to attend integrated schools. At the
same time, however, it would be strange indeed if the remedy of integration
were pursued so vigorously, over so much objection, despite the fact that
there is little value in racially integrated schools. The better conclusion seems
to be that, at some point after Brown, courts and federal officials, not to
mention a large segment of the public, came to embrace the notion that black
and white children should actually go to school together. In this sense,
racially integrated schools carry forward what might be called the moral ideal
43 See Comfort II, 418 F.3d at 18-20 (recognizing this point).
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of Brown, namely that schools should not simply be desegregated but also
integrated.44
One need not rest on history, however, to conclude that there is
continued value to racially integrated schools. Racially integrated schools
offer proven social and academic benefits.45 As described by school districts
that have adopted voluntary integration plans, racially integrated schools can
increase racial tolerance and crossracial understanding, break down racial
stereotypes, and help prepare all students for a diverse workplace. 46 In
addition, racially integrated schools can provide a better academic setting for
all students, and can lead in particular to increased achievement among
minority students, primarily because racially integrated schools are less
likely to be schools of concentrated poverty.47 Finally, racially integrated
schools can benefit the school system as a whole by creating schools that are
at least roughly comparable and not identifiable by race or family income.
This in turn helps create support for the school system as a whole among a
wide spectrum of parents.48
Notice that these benefits are tied specifically to racially integrated
schools, and not to schools that are broadly diverse like colleges or graduate
schools. Some of the benefits, again, are similar in the two settings. But not
all are, and courts faced with voluntary integration plans must focus on the
asserted benefits of racial integration-not on the benefits of an imaginary
plan that seeks broad-based diversity along a number of axes.49
Most of the benefits said to attend racially integrated schools are
supported by social science evidence, which plaintiffs challenging voluntary
integration plans have done little to rebut. This is not to say that the evidence
is pellucid or beyond challenge. Indeed, there is a cottage industry of
conflicting studies regarding the short and long-term benefits of racial
integration.50 Not all integration plans will produce sparkling results, and
many integrated schools have thoroughly segregated classrooms. Although
plaintiffs thus far have not questioned the benefits of racial integration as
vigorously as they might, surely others will.
This raises the question of what courts should do if the evidence
presented regarding the benefits of racial integration is mixed. In Grutter, a
44 Cf McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852 (W.D.
Ky. 2004) (observing that "Brown's original moral and constitutional declaration has
survived to become a mainstream value of American education").
45 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 6, at 296-307.
46 See Comfort II, 418 F.3d at 14; McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 853.
47 McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 853; Parents Involved I, 377 F.3d 949, 991-96
(9th Cir. 2004) (Graber, J., dissenting).
48 McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
49 Parents Involved 1, 377 F.3d at 991-92 (emphasizing this point).
50 See Ryan, supra note 6, at 296-307.
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similar question arose about the benefits of diversity in law schools, and the
Court deferred to the academic judgment of law school officials that diversity
did indeed produce numerous benefits.5' It did so in light of the Court's
traditional deference "to a university's academic decisions," which "includes
the selection of its student body., 52 The Court thus accepted the law school's
assertion that achieving a diverse student body was "at the heart" of its
proper institutional mission and presumed that the law school was acting in
good faith to accomplish that mission.53
Public schools should be afforded similar deference, but for different
reasons and because of a different tradition. That tradition is one of local
control. In numerous desegregation decisions, the Court has recognized that
the tradition of local control is "deeply rooted, '5 "vital, '' 5 and worthy of the
Court's respect. It has relied on that tradition to justify limiting the
geographical reach of desegregation decrees and to justify terminating those
decrees. 56 The Court also relied on the tradition of local control in San
Antonio v. Rodriguez, where it upheld unequal spending among public school
districts that resulted in part from local control over funding. Local control
over schools, the Court observed, "affords some opportunity for
experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational
excellence. 57
Obviously, the principle of local control should not shield all decisions of
school officials from constitutional scrutiny, and some of the Court's
previous invocations of local control can surely be questioned. But just as
obviously, racially integrated schools are perfectly consistent with
constitutional norms, in a way that other policies-for example, intentionally
segregating students by race-are not. In this context, therefore, respect for
local control (not to mention consistency with prior Court decisions and
statements) demands respect for a school board's conclusion that integrated
51 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003).
52 Id. (citation omitted).
53 id. at 329.
54 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) ("No single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools .... ).
55 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) ("As we have long observed, 'local
autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition."') (citation omitted).
56 The Court limited the reach of desegregation decrees in Milliken, and it set forth
criteria for terminating those decress in, inter alia, Freeman. See also Bd. of Educ. of
Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (emphasizing the importance
of local control in decision that also sets forth criteria for terminating desegregation
decrees).
57 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973).
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schools can indeed provide substantial educational benefits.58 Evidence
regarding those benefits may be mixed, and, again, not every plan will
maximize all potential benefits. But courts would do violence to the tradition
of local control of public schools if they required local officials to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of these benefits will be realized.
Instead, courts should respect a local district's conclusion that racially
integrated schools are part of its institutional mission and presume that local
officials are acting in good faith to achieve that mission.59
B. Narrow Tailoring
Given that the Court has never developed a uniform list of narrow
tailoring criteria for every context, a useful place to begin this inquiry is with
general principles that have informed the Court's various narrow tailoring
inquiries. In general, the Court has sought to ensure that any use of race is
necessary and proportional to the declared purpose of the plan or policy, and
also to ensure that the plan does not unduly burden third parties.6° The basic
point of the inquiry is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by ensuring
that the means of using race tightly fit the desired end.61
The specific criteria to use, as already described, must depend on the
context. The inquiry, in the Court's words, "must be calibrated to fit the
distinct issues raised by the use of race" in a particular context, and it must
take "'relevant differences"' among different contexts into account.
62
Importantly, the Court also made relatively clear in Grutter that the narrow
tailoring requirement is not intended to submarine a particular use of race
that has already been deemed compelling.63 The Court rejected the notion,
advanced by the dissent, that narrow tailoring would require the University to
choose between maintaining a highly selective admissions process and
admitting minority students. 64 It would seem to follow that narrow tailoring
58 See Parents Involved 11, 426 F.3d 1162, 1196 (5th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
59 Cf id. at 1188 n.3 (concluding that the school district should be afforded
deference in identifying institutional values); Comfort II, 418 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2005)
(refusing to second guess the district court's finding that the purpose of Lynn's voluntary
integration plan was to obtain the educational benefits that racial diversity provides).
60 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 509-10 (1989)
(plurality opinion); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality
opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280-84 (1986); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-20 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
61 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 333 (2003).
62 Id. at 333-34 (citation omitted).
63 Id. at 339.
64 Id.
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in the context of voluntary integration plans should not require public schools
to choose between integrated schools and fundamentally altering the way that
they assign students to those schools.65
With these general principles in mind, one can turn to the narrow
tailoring criteria employed in Grutter and Gratz to assess which ones are
relevant and which ones are not. To repeat, the criteria impose the following
five requirements: (1) no quotas; (2) individualized, holistic consideration;
(3) no undue harm to third parties; (4) consideration of race-neutral
alternatives; and (5) that the plan be temporary.66
The last three seem relevant and well-suited to the context of voluntary
integration plans, as a recent opinion from the First Circuit recognized.67
Ensuring minimal impact on third parties ensures that the plan sweeps no
more broadly than necessary. Demanding that district officials give good
faith consideration to plausible race-neutral alternatives ensures that the
consideration of race is actually necessary to achieve the stated goals of any
plan. And requiring that the plan be limited in time essentially means that
district officials must periodically review voluntary integration plans to
determine whether they are still necessary to achieve racial integration. This,
too, ensures that the use of race is necessary and that the (temporal) scope of
the plan is duly constrained.
The first two requirements (no quotas, and individualized consideration)
fit less comfortably into this context. The first certainly has symbolic value,
which is diminished outside of the context of merit-based admissions but
does not disappear entirely. Regardless of its precise value in this context, it
is nonetheless easy enough to meet if prohibiting quotas simply means that
plans cannot "impose a fixed number or percentage which must be attained,
or which cannot be exceeded. ' '68 I confess that it has never been clear to me
why quotas, so defined, are impermissible per se, nor have I ever had much
luck distinguishing between "minimum goals," achieving a "critical mass,"
or paying "some attention" to numbers (all of which are allowed), and quotas
(which are not).6 9 The formalistic definition of quotas, in any event, seems
merely to require that plans establish rough goals or ranges of permissible
65 Cf Parents Involved II, 426 F.3d 1162, 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) (making similar
point).
66 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-44.
67 Comfort II, 418 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Parents Involved II, 426 F.3d
at 1180 (suggesting that all but one are criteria-"individualized consideration"-should
be used).
68 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (internal quotation omitted).
69 Cf Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1781 (1986) (arguing that
both race-specific plans and a limited form of quota-basically, establishing a floor under
which numbers should not drop-can be more narrowly tailored than race neutral plans
that forbid any and all types of quotas).
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enrollments, which most plans already do and which is easy enough to fix in
plans that do not.
But the prohibition of quotas is also tied, in Grutter and Gratz, to the use
of race as merely a "plus" factor in admissions, in which race can be given
weight but cannot be dispositive.7 ° In this sense, the prohibition of quotas
bleeds into the second requirement of individualized consideration and
holistic review, which demands that each applicant be "evaluated as an
individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the
defining feature of his or her application."'', Nothing is lost, and some ease of
exposition gained, by combining these various requirements under the
heading of "individualized consideration."
This factor is perhaps the most important one to emerge from the lower
court opinions on voluntary integration plans. Courts that have upheld plans
under review have generally concluded that the factor is not relevant or
should be given little weight, while those that have struck them down have
applied it and found the plans wanting.72 The latter result is not surprising,
because most voluntary integration plans do not even pretend to consider
each "applicant" on an individualized basis. Instead, if they involve school
choice, they make transfers or choices of schools dependant, at least in part,
on the student's race. Only a few selective examination or magnet schools
come close to considering individual students and basing decisions on merit.
The bulk of voluntary integration plans, by contrast, rely neither on merit nor
on individualized consideration.
Getting this point correct, therefore, matters-a lot. To me, it seems plain
that individualized, holistic consideration should not be a requirement in this
context. Consider why this is a narrow tailoring requirement in the context of
admissions to selective colleges or graduate schools. Individualized
consideration ensures that universities achieve their stated goal of broad-
based diversity. As the University of Michigan described, its admissions
policies were designed to "assemble a student body that is diverse in ways
70 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-39; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-76 (2003).
71 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
72 Compare Parents Involved II, 426 F.3d 1162, 1180-84 (9th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that the individualized consideration requirement is inapplicable in context
of voluntary integration plans and upholding plan under review); Comfort II, 418 F.3d at
17-18 (same), with Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 132-33
(4th Cir. 1999) (striking down plan because it focused exculsively on race); Tuttle v.
Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999) (same). But see McFarland
v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 859 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (applying
individualized review requirement and concluding that plan offered "individualized
attention of a different kind" by focusing on students' place of residence and choice of
schools).
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broader than race., 73 The University valued broad-based diversity in part
because it was interested in attaining viewpoint diversity. Focusing solely on
race would not necessarily achieve viewpoint diversity and might also
reinforce the stereotype that minority students share a viewpoint that is
different from the viewpoint of white students.7 4 Individualized consideration
of each applicant is also important because the process is competitive and
merit-based. Considering all students individually, and comparing all
applicants together, avoids the risk that the admissions process will enforce a
stereotype that racial minorities "are unable to achieve success without
special protection.,
75
Most voluntary integration plans, by contrast, are designed to achieve
racial integration. If reducing racial isolation and increasing racial integration
are considered constitutionally permissible goals, it would seem to follow
that race alone-and not each student's overall potential to enhance
diversity--can and should form the basis for decisions.76 In addition, because
most voluntary integration plans are not merit-based, the risk of stigmatic
harm from the use of race is largely reduced.77 Finally, requiring
individualized consideration of each student in voluntary integration plans
would require either drastic changes to most plans or lead to their
elimination. As one commentator remarked, it is a little ridiculous to imagine
"phalanxes of public school admissions officers purporting to conduct
searching, individualized 'holistic reviews' of detailed files of millions of
four-year olds applying to kindergartens across the country. 78
In short, demanding that K-12 schools use race only in the same manner
as universities ignores the fundamental differences between those institutions
and the reason for the narrow tailoring inquiry in the first place. Narrow
tailoring should ensure a close fit between means and ends, not ensure that a
use of race considered compelling can never be implemented. There is
nothing in Grutter or Gratz that suggests that public schools must adopt
merit-based admissions policies before they can use race to achieve
integrated schools, nor are the purposes behind narrow tailoring served by
essentially thwarting most voluntary integration plans.
73 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
74 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72.
75 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
76 Cf Parents Involved II, 426 F.3d at 1183 (focusing solely on race is acceptable
when the school district has a compelling interest in reducing de facto racial segregation);
Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding
that, if reducing racial isolation is a compelling interest, "then there is no more effective
means of achieving that goal than to base decisions on race").
77 See Comfort 11, 418 F.3d at 18.
78 Levine, supra note 30, at 521.
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With that said, courts-and ultimately the Supreme Court-may
nonetheless see value in at least requiring that race not be the only factor that
guides student assignments. One sees in Grutter and Gratz, and Bakke before
them, evidence of a belief that it is better if the use of race is hidden rather
than overt. 79 The motivation to hide the use of race is tied, in the admissions
context, to the danger of stigmatic harm and to the racial hostility that might
be generated by a more overt process that reserves seats for "less qualified"
minority students. This precise risk does not arise when students are assigned
a school without consideration of merit. Nonetheless, there is a risk that any
overt consideration of race, especially a mechanical one where students can
transfer or not depending on their race, "will breed cross-racial tension. 8°
And although students denied the ability to transfer from one school to
another are not denied a public education, they are obviously denied their
first choice among schools. However courts might downplay the significance
of that harm, parents and students denied entrance to a particular school
because of race will surely feel harmed.
It is questionable, of course, whether anyone denied admission to a
university or entrance to a public school would feel less harmed by the covert
use of race. Perhaps courts overestimate the opacity of any process in which
race is purportedly just a "plus-factor," and underestimate the degree to
which those denied admission or entrance will nonetheless view the process
as not only wrong or immoral (because race is determinative) but also
dishonest (because everyone knows, but officials cannot admit, that race is
determinative). Nonetheless, it surely remains plausible to suppose that
downplaying the use of race, all things considered, is better than flaunting it.
One could thus imagine, and even defend, a decision to retain some
requirement that race not be the sole factor in assigning students in the
context of voluntary integration plans. The requirement should not be so
stringent that it requires a holistic review of the merits of each student and an
evaluation of his or her ability to enhance diversity. Instead, courts could
require that the ability to choose a particular school, or transfer from one to
the other, be tied to a number of requirements, such as geography, proximity,
or the fit between a school's particular programs and a student's interests or
talents. 81 Race could be one factor, and a strong one, but it could be relegated
79 Justice Ginsburg, for example, chided the majority in Gratz on just this point: "If
honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan's accurately described, fully disclosed
College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through
winks, nods, and disguises." Gratz, 539 U.S. at 305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For an
elegant defense of Grutter and Bakke's treatment of this issue, see John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
Bakke Revisited, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 17 (2003).
80 Comfort II, 418 F.3d at 30 (Selya, J., dissenting).
81 McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F.Supp. 2d 834, 859 (W.D. Ky.
2004) (concluding that the plan at issue provided sufficient attention to individuals
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to the status of a "'plus' factor.,8 2 This would add some administrative
burdens to voluntary integration plans, to be sure, but they would not be so
onerous as to effectively preclude them. Some analytical rigor in court
decisions and transparency in governmental decisions would be lost, but
perhaps the purported gain in racial harmony would offset those costs.8
3
A proper narrow tailoring inquiry in this context, therefore, would
certainly ask whether race-neutral alternatives were considered in good faith,
whether the plan will be revisited periodically to ensure it is necessary, and
whether the plan unduly harms a particular group of students. In addition, the
formal prohibition on quotas can and should be carried over to this context.
The requirement of individualized consideration, however, ought to be
largely if not completely abandoned.84 If it plays any role at all, it should be
used only to ensure that factors other than race (such as geography,
proximity, or student interest) also inform assignments, and not to force
public schools to choose between integrating their schools and adopting a
merit-based admissions process for public school students.
I1. CONCLUSION
The analysis I have sketched would likely lead to the approval of most
voluntary integration plans, although some might have to be tweaked a bit,
especially if courts decide to require that race only be a "plus" factor. I am
not hesitant to reveal that this result coheres with my own policy preferences,
in part because I disagree with what seems to be the prevailing sentiment that
those who favor integrated schools should be somewhat embarrassed by that
preference--or at least quiet about it. Of course, I recognize that, in this age
of cynicism regarding constitutional analysis, this admission may be enough
to disqualify my legal analysis in the eyes of some readers. I nonetheless
believe that mine is an honest and fair application of the Court's case law-
but then again, so say the cynics, I would.
Notwithstanding whatever skepticism might linger in readers, it is my
hope that this analysis might play some small role in helping to dispel the
legal uncertainty that hangs over voluntary integration plans. In my view,
removing legal uncertainty is the least we can do for districts that have the
far-sightedness and fortitude to adopt voluntary integration plans. Consider
because it considered a student's place of residence and choice of school or program in
addition to race).
82 See Comfort II, 418 F.3d at 31 (Selya, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a transfer
program, where race is a "'plus' factor" but not determinative, would be constitutional).
83 Cf Jeffries, supra note 79, at 21 (discussing Bakke's "sacrifice of cogency for
wisdom").
84 See Parents Involved 1I, 426 F.3d 1162, 1180-84 (9th Cir. 2005); Comfort 11, 418
F.3d at 18-19.
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for a moment just how difficult, politically, it must be to create and
implement voluntary integration plans, and consider how courageous those
officials who persist must be. Consider as well that most parents care deeply
about where their children attend school, and that those parents used to
getting their way in life will not sit idly by if they feel that school districts are
slighting their children. There is no chance that voluntary integration plans
are going to be adopted without intense public debate and scrutiny by all who
might be affected.
This does not seem like a situation crying out for extensive involvement
by federal courts that, in prior incantations of the desegregation debate, have
issued paeans to local control.85 School districts that create voluntary
integration plans ought to be applauded, and others ought to be encouraged to
follow their lead. Without these plans, many of our public schools will
(continue to) be as racially isolated as our law schools and colleges would be
without affirmative action. School boards need and deserve our help to
fashion workable, sustainable plans that maximize the benefits of integration
and minimize the costs necessary to achieve it. They do not need, and do not
deserve, litigation designed to derail and deter even modest efforts at
integration.
85 See Parents Involved II, 426 F.3d at 1196 (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("When it
comes to a [voluntary integration] plan such as this-a plan that gives the American
melting pot a healthy stir without benefiting or burdening any particular group-I would
leave the decision to those much closer to the affected community .... ").
20061

